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HAVING IT BOTH WAYS: HOW CHARTER SCHOOLS TRY 
TO OBTAIN FUNDING OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE 
AUTONOMY OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
Preston C. Green III* 
Bruce D. Baker** 
Joseph O. Oluwole*** 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1992, forty-two states and the District of Columbia have enacted 
legislation for charter schools.1 As of December 2011, there were 5,700 charter 
schools educating 1.9 million students.2 Charter schools are characterized as 
public schools that receive autonomy from a variety of rules and regulations 
that traditional public schools must follow.3 In exchange for this increased 
autonomy, charter schools are accountable to the requirements that are 
established in the charter.4 Failure to satisfy those requirements could result in 
the closing of the school.5 
Charter schools and “traditional public schools” are similar in that they are 
directly subsidized by a combination of primarily state and local taxes based 
on their enrollments.6 However, the authorization process for these two types 
of schools can be quite different. Local education agencies (LEAs), which are 
usually school districts that are governed by elected school boards, decide to 
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 1 See Choice & Charter Schools: Laws & Legislation, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, http://www.edreform. 
com/issues/choice-charter-schools/laws-legislation/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2013) (noting that the states without 
charter schools are Alabama, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and West 
Virginia).  
 2 Choice & Charter Schools: Facts, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, http://www.edreform.com/issues/choice-
charter-schools/facts/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2013). 
 3 See What Are Public Charter Schools?, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., http://www. 
publiccharters.org/About-Charter-Schools/What-are-Charter-Schools003F.aspx (last visited Dec. 11, 2013). 
 4 Charter Schools 101: The Most Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER 
SCHS., http://www.publiccharters.org/About-Charter-Schools/Frequently-Asked-Questions.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 11, 2013). 
 5 See id.  
 6 What Are Public Charter Schools?, supra note 3.  
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open new traditional public schools.7 While LEAs may open new charter 
schools in many states, some state statutes grant chartering authority to 
nonprofit private entities that are governed by boards of directors consisting of 
private citizens.8 Traditional public schools and charter schools may also differ 
in terms of how they are governed. While LEAs generally govern traditional 
public schools, many states permit private boards of directors to operate 
charter schools.9 Another key difference between traditional public schools and 
charter schools is that charter school governing boards might choose to 
contract a private entity, or educational management organization (EMO), to 
manage and operate the school.10 
This Article discusses how charter schools have used their hybrid 
characteristics to obtain the benefits of public funding while circumventing 
state and federal rights and protections for employees and students that apply 
to traditional public schools. The first Part explains how charter schools have 
emphasized their “public” characteristics to withstand state constitutional 
challenges that they are ineligible for public funding because they are private 
schools or fall outside of a system of public schools. 
The second and third Parts of this Article explain how charter schools have 
emphasized their private characteristics to avoid having to comply with state 
and federal protections that protect employees and students. Specifically, the 
second Part discusses how privately run charter school boards and EMOs have 
evaded state union election laws by arguing that they are private entities that 
are covered by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a federal statute that 
governs private-sector employment. The third Part discusses how charter 
schools have attempted to evade federal constitutional and statutory protections 
for employees and students by arguing that they are not state actors pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal statute that establishes a cause of action for 




 7 See Bruce D. Baker, Charter Schools Are . . . [Public? Private? Neither? Both?], SCH. FIN. 101 (May 
2, 2012), http://schoolfinance101.wordpress.com/2012/05/02/charter-schools-are-public-private-neither-both/. 
 8 Id.  
 9 Id.  
 10 Id.  
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state law.11 These Parts also point out that attempts to circumvent state and 
federal protections for students and employees may have unintended 
consequences, such as inviting federal involvement in charter school labor 
policies, or causing state courts to revisit the question of whether charter 
schools are public schools eligible for funding under state constitutional law. 
I. CHARTER SCHOOLS, PUBLIC SCHOOL FUNDING, AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 
Plaintiffs have alleged that the private characteristics possessed by charter 
schools render them ineligible for funding under state constitutions. Charter 
schools have survived these challenges by convincing courts that they are 
sufficiently public to be eligible for funding. This section discusses how 
charter schools have withstood challenges under two types of constitutional 
provisions based on their private characteristics: (1) state constitutional 
provisions that prohibit funding to these types of schools and (2) state 
constitutional provisions requiring the state to provide a uniform or efficient 
system of public schools. 
A. Category #1: Are Charter Schools Too Privately Governed to Be Eligible 
for Funding? 
Courts in Michigan and California have examined whether the private 
characteristics of charter schools make them private schools that are ineligible 
for public funding. These decisions are significant because sixteen charter 
school states have similar constitutional provisions. Seven charter school states 
have constitutional provisions barring the funding of private schools with 
public funds: Alaska,12 Arizona,13 Hawaii,14 Michigan,15 New Mexico,16 South 
 
 11 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit 
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .  
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 12 ALASKA CONST. art. 7, § 1 (“No money shall be paid from public funds for the direct benefit of any 
religious or other private educational institution.”).  
 13 ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10 (“No tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money made in aid of any 
church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service corporation.”). 
 14 HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1 (“[N]or shall public funds be appropriated for the support or benefit of any 
sectarian or nonsectarian private educational institution . . . .”). 
GREENBAKEROLUWOLE GALLEYSPROOFS 1/21/2014 3:59 PM 
306 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:303 
Carolina,17 and Wyoming.18 Seven states with charter schools have 
constitutional provisions limiting educational funds to public, free, or common 
schools: Connecticut,19 Georgia,20 Missouri,21 New Jersey,22 Rhode Island,23 
Texas,24 and Washington.25 Two states with charter schools have constitutional 
provisions that prohibit the funding of any schools that are not under the 
exclusive control of the state: California26 and Massachusetts.27 
 
 15 MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public 
credit utilized . . . directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, pre-
elementary, elementary, or secondary school.”). 
 16 N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3 (“[N]o part of the proceeds arising from the sale or disposal of any lands 
granted to the state by congress, or any other funds appropriated, levied or collected for educational purposes, 
shall be used for the support of any sectarian, denominational or private school, college or university.”). 
 17 S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (“No money shall be paid from public funds nor shall the credit of the State or 
any of its political subdivisions be used for the direct benefit of any religious or other private educational 
institution.”). 
 18 WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (“[N]or shall any portion of any public school fund ever be used to support 
or assist any private school, or any school, academy, seminary, college or other institution of learning 
controlled by any church or sectarian organization or religious denomination whatsoever.”). 
 19 CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (“The fund, called the SCHOOL FUND, shall remain a perpetual fund, the 
interest of which shall be inviolably appropriated to the support and encouragement of the public schools 
throughout the state, and for the equal benefit of all the people thereof. The value and amount of said fund 
shall be ascertained in such manner as the general assembly may prescribe, published, and recorded in the 
comptroller’s office; and no law shall ever be made, authorizing such fund to be diverted to any other use than 
the encouragement and support of public schools, among the several school societies, as justice and equity 
shall require.”). 
 20 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6, para. I(b) (“School tax funds shall be expended only for the support and 
maintenance of public schools, public vocational-technical schools, public education, and activities necessary 
or incidental thereto, including school lunch purposes.”). 
 21 MO. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (establishing “a public school fund the annual income of which shall be 
faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining free public schools, and for no other uses or purposes 
whatsoever”). 
 22 N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 2 (“The fund for the support of free public schools . . . shall be 
annually appropriated to the support of free public schools, and for the equal benefit of all the people of the 
State; and it shall not be competent, except as hereinafter provided, for the Legislature to borrow, appropriate 
or use the said fund or any part thereof for any other purpose, under any pretense whatever.”). 
 23 R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 2 (“The money which now is or which may hereafter be appropriated by law for 
the establishment of a permanent fund for the support of public schools, shall be securely invested and remain 
a perpetual fund for that purpose.”); id. § 4 (“The general assembly shall make all necessary provisions by law 
for carrying this article into effect. It shall not divert said money or fund from the aforesaid uses, nor borrow, 
appropriate, or use the same, or any part thereof, for any other purpose, under any pretence whatsoever.”). 
 24 TEX. CONST. art. 7, § 5(c) (“The available school fund shall be applied annually to the support of the 
public free schools. Except as provided by this section, the legislature may not enact a law appropriating any 
part of the permanent school fund or available school fund to any other purpose. The permanent school fund 
and the available school fund may not be appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian school.”). 
 25 WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“[T]he entire revenue derived from the common school fund and the state 
tax for common schools shall be exclusively applied to the support of the common schools.”). 
 26 CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (“No public money shall ever be appropriated for the support of any sectarian 
or denominational school, or any school not under the exclusive control of the officers of the public schools; 
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In Council of Organizations & Others for Education About Parochiaid v. 
Engler,28 the Supreme Court of Michigan found that the state’s charter school 
statute did not violate article VIII, section 2 of its constitution, which provides, 
“No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public 
credit utilized . . . directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, 
denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary 
school.”29 The plaintiffs alleged that charter schools violated section 2 
“because they were not under the immediate and exclusive control of the 
state.”30 The Michigan Supreme Court found that this constitutional provision 
did not require the state to exercise exclusive control.31 However, the court 
acknowledged that other states had recognized the need to exercise some 
control in order for a school to qualify for funding.32 Charter schools satisfied 
this requirement “because they are under the ultimate and immediate control of 
the state and its agents.”33 First, the authorizing body could revoke a charter 
when it had a reasonable ground for revocation, such as the school’s failure to 
comply with the terms of its charter or with all applicable law.34 Second, 
authorizing bodies, which were public institutions, exercised control over 
charter schools through the application approval process.35 Third, the state set 
the qualifications for determining whether charter schools were eligible for 
funding.36 Finally, other sections of the school code applied to charter 
schools.37 
The Michigan Supreme Court rejected the argument that charter schools 
were unconstitutionally funded private schools because they were not under 
the control of the qualified voters of the school district. The court observed that 
 
nor shall any sectarian or denominational doctrine be taught, or instruction thereon be permitted, directly or 
indirectly, in any of the common schools of this State.”). 
 27 MASS. CONST. amend. art. CIII (“No grant, appropriation or use of public money or property or loan of 
credit shall be made or authorized by the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof for the purpose 
of founding, maintaining or aiding any . . . primary or secondary school . . . which is not publicly owned and 
under the exclusive control, order and supervision of public officers or public agents authorized by the 
Commonwealth or federal authority or both . . . .”). 
 28 566 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1997).  
 29 MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. 
 30 Parochiaid, 566 N.W.2d at 216.  
 31 See id.  
 32 Id.  
 33 Id.  
 34 Id.  
 35 Id.  
 36 Id. at 216–17.  
 37 Id. at 217.  
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the Corpus Juris Secundum had defined public schools as, “broadly speaking, 
open and public to all in the locality, which the state undertakes through 
various boards and officers to direct, manage, and control, and which is subject 
to and under the control of the qualified voters of the school district in which it 
is situate[d].”38 The Parochiaid court also noted that the Washington Supreme 
Court, in State ex rel. School District No. 3 v. Preston, had defined a common 
school as “common to all children of proper age and capacity, free, and subject 
to and under the control of the qualified voters of the district.”39 However, the 
Michigan court found that article VIII, section 2 did not require public schools 
to be under the control of the voters of the school district, but rather that they 
be under the control of the state legislature, which was under the command of 
the state electorate.40 
The plaintiffs also alleged that charter schools were not public schools 
because private boards of directors ran them, and the authorizing bodies had no 
means for selecting board members.41 The court rejected this argument because 
the power “granted by the Constitution to the Legislature to establish 
a . . . primary school system carried with it the authority to prescribe what 
officers should be chosen to conduct the affairs of the school districts, to define 
their powers and duties, . . . and how and by whom they should be chosen.”42 
The legislature exercised control by empowering the authorizing body to 
establish “the method of selection, length of term, and number of members of 
the board of directors of each [charter school] subject to its jurisdiction.”43 The 
court further pointed out that the authorizing bodies were publicly elected or 
appointed by public bodies.44 While the charter school boards of directors may 
not have been elected, the public maintained control over charter schools 
through the authorizing bodies.45 
In Wilson v. State Board of Education, a California appellate court found 
that charter schools did not violate article IX, section 8 of the state constitution, 
which provides, “‘No public money shall ever be appropriated for the support 
of any sectarian or denominational school, or any school not under the 
 
 38 Id. at 218 (footnotes omitted) (quoting 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 2).  
 39 Id. (quoting State ex rel. School District No. 3 v. Preston, 140 P. 350, 351 (Wash. 1914)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted).  
 40 Id. at 218–19.  
 41 Id. at 217. 
 42 Id. (quoting Belles v. Burr, 43 N.W. 24, 28 (Mich. 1889)).  
 43 Id. (quoting 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 362).  
 44 Id.  
 45 Id. at 217–18. 
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exclusive control of the officers of the public schools . . . .’”46 First, the court 
found that the exclusive control requirement was met because the legislature 
had declared that charters were under the control of the legislature and directed 
the courts “to construe the law liberally to effectuate that finding.”47 Second, 
charter schools were not in opposition to the public schools, but were instead a 
part of the system.48 “Although they have operational independence,” the court 
explained that “an overarching purpose of the charter school approach is to 
infuse the public school system with competition in order to stimulate 
continuous improvement in all its schools.”49 
Third, the court “wonder[ed] what level of control could be more complete 
than where . . . the very destiny of charter schools lies solely in the hands of 
public agencies and offices, from the local to the state level: school 
districts . . . [and] county boards of education.”50 The court observed that the 
chartering authority exercised control from the application approval process to 
the revocation of the charter.51 Further, the state board of education could 
revoke a charter or “take other action in the face of certain grave breaches of 
financial, fiduciary or educational responsibilities” and 
“exercise[d] . . . control . . . through its power to promulgate implementing 
regulations.”52 Finally, the superintendent of education exercised the power of 
public funding of charter schools.53 
Fourth, the court concluded that these features added up to sufficient 
constitutional control even when the charter school chose to operate as a 
nonprofit public-benefit corporation or remained under the umbrella of the 
charter authorizer.54 Fifth, the court rejected the argument that, due to the 
decision-making role of the charter grantees, there would not be sufficient 
control over the school’s curriculum and educational functions because, 
ultimately, those matters were left to legislative discretion.55 The court 
reasoned that the legislature had exercised its discretion through the charter 
 
 46 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 753 (Ct. App. 1999) (omission in original) (quoting CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8).  
 47 Id. at 754. 
 48 Id.  
 49 Id.  
 50 Id.  
 51 Id.  
 52 Id. at 755.  
 53 Id.  
 54 Id. 
 55 Id.  
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school law to permit “innovative practices and experimentation.”56 Finally, the 
court rejected the argument that the grantees were not officers of public 
schools because the legislature had the authority to designate school districts 
and the legislature had declared that charter schools were school districts.57 
B. Category #2: Do the Private Characteristics of Charter Schools Cause 
Them to Fall Outside of an Efficient or Uniform System of Public Schools? 
Courts in California, Colorado, and Ohio have examined claims that charter 
schools are so much like private schools that they fall outside of an “efficient” 
or “uniform” system of public schools. These cases are significant because 
thirteen charter school states have constitutional provisions that impose a duty 
to provide an “efficient” or “uniform” system of public schools: Colorado,58 
Florida,59 Idaho,60 Indiana,61 Minnesota,62 Nevada,63 New Mexico,64 North 
Carolina,65 Ohio,66 Oregon,67 Washington,68 Wisconsin,69 and Wyoming.70 
 
 56 Id.  
 57 Id. at 755–56.  
 58 COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the 
establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state, 
wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be educated 
gratuitously.”). 
 59 FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (“The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the 
State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of 
all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, 
secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education 
and for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public 
education programs that the needs of the people may require.”).  
 60 IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon 
the intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho, to establish and maintain a 
general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools.”).  
 61 IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, 
being essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to 
encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide 
by law for a general and uniform system of common schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and 
equally open to all.”). 
 62 MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (“The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly 
upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature to establish a general and uniform system of 
public schools. The legislature shall make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough 
and efficient system of public schools throughout the state.”). 
 63 NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 2 (“The legislature shall provide for a uniform system of common schools, by 
which a school shall be established and maintained in each school district at least six months in every year, and 
any school district which shall allow instruction of a sectarian character therein may be deprived of its 
proportion of the interest of the public school fund during such neglect or infraction, and the legislature may 
pass such laws as will tend to secure a general attendance of the children in each school district upon said 
public schools.”). 
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In Boulder Valley School District RE-2 v. Colorado State Board of 
Education, the Colorado Court of Appeals examined whether its charter school 
statute violated article IX, section 2 of the state constitution, which requires 
that the legislature provide “a thorough and uniform system” of public schools 
by creating a separate school system that was outside of the control of school 
districts.71 The court rejected this argument because the legislature had an 
“‘almost unlimited power to abolish, divide or alter school districts.’”72 The 
court further analogized the instant case to Lujan v. Colorado State Board of 
Education, a school finance case in which the Colorado Supreme Court had 
held that the school finance system did not violate the “thorough and uniform” 
clause.73 Specifically, in Lujan, the court held that the “thorough and uniform” 
clause was satisfied so long as “thorough and uniform educational 
opportunities are available through state action in each school district,”74 but 
did not require “educational expenditures per pupil in every local school 
district to be identical.”75 Similarly, the state court of appeals in Boulder Valley 
found that the thorough and uniform clause permitted the state to “provide 
additional educational opportunities open to all students in the state 
through . . . charter schools, provided that these opportunities are available 
 
 64 N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“A uniform system of free public schools sufficient for the education of, 
and open to, all the children of school age in the state shall be established and maintained.”).  
 65 N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“The General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general 
and uniform system of free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in every year, and 
wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students.”). 
 66 OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“The General Assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation or 
otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system 
of common schools throughout the state . . . .”). 
 67 OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (“The Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for the establishment of a 
uniform, and general system of Common schools.”). 
 68 WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public 
schools. The public school system shall include common schools, and such high schools, normal schools, and 
technical schools as may hereafter be established. But the entire revenue derived from the common school 
fund and the state tax for common schools shall be exclusively applied to the support of the common 
schools.”). 
 69 WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 (“The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, 
which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable . . . .”). 
 70 WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (“The legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a 
complete and uniform system of public instruction, embracing free elementary schools of every needed kind 
and grade, a university with such technical and professional departments as the public good may require and 
the means of the state allow, and such other institutions as may be necessary.”). 
 71 217 P.3d 918, 925 (Colo. App. 2009) (quoting COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2). 
 72 Id. at 928 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Booth, 984 P.2d 639, 646 n.3 (Colo.1999)).  
 73 See id.; Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1010–11 (Colo. 1982).  
 74 Boulder Valley, 217 P.3d at 928 (quoting Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1025) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 75 Id. 
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state-wide.”76 Therefore, the court saw no reason why “section 2 should be 
read to prohibit the State from creating a school system with different types of 
schools, some controlled by school districts while others are not.”77 
Courts in California and Ohio pointed to the fact that their state charter 
schools had to comply with the same accountability standards as traditional 
public schools. In Wilson, the California appellate court found that charter 
schools did not violate article IX, section 5 of the state constitution,78 which 
mandates that the legislature provide a “system of common schools.”79 The 
court defined the “systems” requirement as a 
unity of purpose as well as an entirety of operation, and the direction 
to the legislature to provide “a” system of common schools means 
one system which shall be applicable to all the common schools 
within the state. This means that the educational system must be 
uniform in terms of the prescribed course of study and educational 
progression from grade to grade.80 
The court found that charter schools were part of a “uniform” system because 
the legislature had explicitly declared that charter schools were “part of 
the . . . Public School System,” “under its jurisdiction,” and “entitled to full 
funding.”81 Further, charter schools satisfied the uniformity requirement 
because (1) the teachers were required to 
meet[] the same minimum requirements as all other public school 
teachers; (2) their educational programs [had to] be geared to meet 
the same state standards, including minimum duration of instruction, 
applicable to all public schools; and (3) student progress . . . [was] 
measured by the same assessments required of all public school 
students.82 
In Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Board of Education, the 
Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the state’s charter school statute did not violate 
article VI, section 2 of the Ohio constitution, 83 which provides: “The General 
Assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation or otherwise, as, with the 
 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id.  
 78 Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 752–53 (Ct. App. 1999).  
 79 Id. at 751. 
 80 Id. at 752 (citations omitted) (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1248–49 (Cal. 1971)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 81 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 82 Id. at 753.  
 83 111 Ohio St. 3d 568, 2006-Ohio-5512, 857 N.E.2d 1148, at ¶ 74.  
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income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient 
system of common schools throughout the state.”84 In reaching this conclusion, 
the court explained that charter school students had to pass the same 
graduation tests that students in traditional public schools had to pass.85 Also, 
charter schools were required to “administer proficiency and achievement 
tests, and diagnostic tests, maintain adequate facilities” as well as comply with 
numerous school code provisions, “as if they were school districts.”86 Further, 
the state department of education monitored and supervised charter 
authorizers.87 While charter schools received exemptions from state rules and 
regulations, the court characterized many of the exemptions as “picayune in 
nature.”88 
The Ohio court further found that the “thorough and efficient” standard 
permitted the legislature to create alternative accountability and academic 
standards for charter schools.89 Indeed, charter schools faced heightened 
accountability because sponsors could shut them down for failing to meet 
expected academic goals and unsatisfied parents could withdraw their 
children.90 Also, charter schools could tailor their academic and accountability 
requirements because they served targeted populations.91 To require charter 
schools to be operated like traditional public schools would contravene the 
legislative goal of providing educational opportunity for children who may 
benefit more from alternative settings.92 
II. CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 
While charter schools have emphasized their public characteristics to be 
eligible for funding under state constitutional law, they have also emphasized 
their private characteristics to be exempted from state and federal protections 
that are provided by traditional public schools for employees and students. 
Collective bargaining is an example. Approximately 12% of all charter schools 
 
 84 Id. ¶ 24 (quoting OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2).  
 85 Id. ¶ 30.  
 86 Id. (citations omitted). 
 87 Id.  
 88 Id.  
 89 Id. ¶ 31.  
 90 Id.  
 91 Id.  
 92 See id. ¶ 32.  
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are unionized.93 By contrast, in 2012, 35.4% of employed wage and salary 
workers in the education, training, and library professions were members of 
unions.94 Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia exempt all charter 
schools from school district collective bargaining agreements.95 Labor unions 
have sought to increase their involvement in charter schools.96 Charter school 
advocates argue that charter schools have the autonomy to try innovative 
strategies, such as extending the school day or increasing instructional time, 
that are not supported by collective bargaining agreements.97 
In two decisions, Chicago Mathematics & Science Academy Charter 
School98 and Pilsen Wellness Center,99 the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) held that it had jurisdiction over two Chicago charter schools 
employing entities under the National Labor Relations Act, the federal statute 
that applies to private-sector employment relations. Illinois is one of the 
twenty-one states that exempt charter schools from collective bargaining 
agreements.100 The employing entities preferred the federal act to state law 
because they apply different rules with respect to union organizing.101 Illinois 
law permits public-sector employees to organize as a bargaining unit through a 
card check process, in which a majority of employees sign an authorization 
form stating that they wish to be represented by a union.102 By contrast, the 
NLRA permits the employer to petition for a secret ballot election.103 Also, 
 
 93 Public Charter Schools and Teachers Unions, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., 
http://www.publiccharters.org/editor/files/NAPCS%20Documents/PublicCharterSchoolsandTeachersUnions.p
df. (last visited Dec. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Charter Schools and Teachers Unions].  
 94 Table 3. Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and Industry, 
BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm (last modified Jan. 23, 2013). 
 95 NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., MEASURING UP TO THE MODEL: A RANKING OF STATE 
CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS 8 tbl.3 (4th ed. 2013), available at http://www.publiccharters.org/data/files/ 
Publication_docs/NAPCS_2013%20Model%20Law%20Rankings_20130123T175438.pdf. Those states are as 
follows: Arizona, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. 
 96 E.g., Stephanie Banchero & Caroline Porter, Unions’ Charter-School Push: Labor Looks to Organize 
in an Educational Sector That Has Largely Kept It Away, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2013, 7:43 PM), http://online. 
wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324010704578418710940566402.html.  
 97 See Charter Schools and Teachers Unions, supra note 93.  
 98 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (Dec. 14, 2012).  
 99 359 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (Mar. 8, 2013).  
 100 NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., supra note 95, at 8. 
 101 See Charter School Newsletter, MCKENNA, LONG, & ALDRIDGE LLP (Jan. 30, 2013), 
https://www.mckennalong.com/media/library/1977_Charter%20Schools%20Newsletter%20-
%20January2013%20_FINAL_.pdf.  
 102 See 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7(c-5) (West 2009). 
 103 National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (2006).  
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Illinois law subjected employers to mediation and/or binding interest 
arbitration to obtain a final contract in case of an impasse.104 The NLRA, on 
the other hand, did not impose such requirements on employers, and also 
permitted the parties to influence negotiations through a strike or employee 
lockout.105 
This section summarizes the Chicago Mathematics and Pilsen decisions 
and explains how these decisions might have the unintended consequence of 
opening the door to more federal involvement in the labor practices of charter 
schools. 
A. Chicago Mathematics and Pilsen Wellness Center 
In Chicago Mathematics, the private, nonprofit corporation that ran the 
charter school petitioned the NLRB after a union requested an election of 
teachers and staff.106 The pertinent question was whether the corporation was 
an “employer” under section 2(2) of the NLRA.107 Section 2(2) provides that 
the term “employer” does not include political subdivisions.108 The acting 
regional director found that the corporation was a political subdivision under 
the test established by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility 
District of Hawkins County.109 Under Hawkins County, an entity is a political 
subdivision if it was “either (1) created directly by the state, so as to constitute 
departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered by 
individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general 
electorate.”110 
The NLRB granted the corporation’s request to review.111 It reinstated the 
petition, finding that it had jurisdiction.112 Applying Hawkins County, the 
Board found that the corporation was not a political subdivision.113 The 
corporation failed the first prong because private individuals, acting through 
private corporations, create charter schools through the framework provided by 
 
 104 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13–14. 
 105 See 29 U.S.C. § 158.  
 106 Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41, slip op. at 1 (Dec. 14, 2012).  
 107 Id.  
 108 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). 
 109 Chicago Mathematics, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41, slip op. at 1. 
 110 NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cnty., 402 U.S. 600, 604–05 (1971).  
 111 Chicago Mathematics, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41, slip op. at 1.  
 112 Id.  
 113 Id. 
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the enabling statute.114 The corporation failed to satisfy the second prong of 
Hawkins County because the bylaws provided that “only sitting board 
members may appoint [or] remove other [charter school] board members.”115 
Also, only board members were authorized to elect and remove the employing 
entity’s corporate officers, and only board members could be selected for the 
corporation’s finance and audit committee.116 
After the NLRB found that the corporation was not a political subdivision, 
it then concluded that the corporation was an employer under section 2(2) of 
the Act.117 The corporation controlled “most, if not all, matters relating to the 
employment relationship,” such as hiring, firing, and paying benefits.118 
Further, this case was similar to other cases involving governmental 
contractors. Even though these contractors were “subject to exacting oversight 
in the form of statutes, regulations, and agreements,” the NLRB exercised 
jurisdiction over these private entities under section 2(2).119 This provision 
exempted “only government entities or wholly owned government 
corporations from its coverage⎯not private entities acting as contractors for 
the government.”120 
The Pilsen Wellness Center case involved an EMO that contracted with a 
charter school to provide teaching staff.121 The pertinent question was whether 
the EMO was a political subdivision under the second prong of the Hawkins 
County test—whether the EMO was under the control of public officials or the 
electorate.122 Applying its analysis in Chicago Mathematics, the NLRB 
concluded that the EMO was not a political subdivision because the EMO’s 
board of directors had the sole power to appoint and remove its members, and 
the EMO was governed by its own bylaws, instead of state statutes and 
regulations.123 
 
 114 Id., slip op. at 6.  
 115 Id., slip op. at 9. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id., slip op. at 12.  
 118 Id., slip op. at 10.  
 119 Id.  
 120 Id. (quoting Research Found. of the City Univ. of N.Y., 337 N.L.R.B. 965, 968 (2002)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 121 359 N.L.R.B. No. 72, slip op. at 1 (Mar. 8, 2013). 
 122 Id., slip op. at 3.  
 123 Id., slip op. at 3–4. 
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B. Implications for Charter Schools 
While the Chicago Mathematics and Pilsen Wellness Center cases may 
appear to be victories for charter school employers, they may actually be a 
boon to teachers unions in the long run. Antiunion commentators complained 
that the NLRB had ignored its precedent of not exercising jurisdiction in 
instances where the employing entities were entwined with the government.124 
They have argued that unionization under the NLRA will stifle the 
implementation of creative approaches that affect employment conditions.125 
They have also cited federalism concerns126 and the possibility that the 
NLRB’s exercise of jurisdiction will frustrate right-to-work statutes, which 
authorize employees to decide for themselves whether or not to join a union.127 
Another possible reason for their displeasure is that the NLRB’s exercise of 
jurisdiction may frustrate attempts by employing entities to avoid both public- 
and private-sector collective bargaining. Charter school employers may have 
hoped to emphasize the private characteristics of charter schools to argue that 
they were not public under state labor laws and thus outside of the jurisdiction 
of state labor commissions. At the same time, they were anticipating that the 
NLRB would not exercise jurisdiction of charter schools under federal private-
sector law. 
The experience of the Cesar Chavez Academy, a Detroit charter school, 
supports this assertion. In 2006, a union filed a petition with the Michigan 
Employment Relations Commission to represent the teachers, social workers, 
and school counselors of the Academy pursuant to Michigan’s Public 
Employment Relations Act.128 The petition named the charter school and the 
EMO that provided employees for the school as the employers.129 The EMO 
that hired the employees for the Academy countered that the NLRA preempted 
the Commission’s jurisdiction, and that the particular positions at issue did not 
fall under the definition of “public employee” under Michigan’s employment 
 
 124 Joe Luppino-Esposito, NLRB Reaches into State Education, ST. BUDGET SOLUTIONS (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/blog/detail/nlrb-reaches-into-state-education; Ctr. for Union Facts, In 
Post-Election Spree, NLRB Discards Precedent at Every Turn, LABORPAINS (Jan. 3, 2013), http://laborpains. 
org/2013/01/03/in-post-election-spree-nlrb-discards-precedent-at-every-turn/.  
 125 Luppino-Esposito, supra note 124.  
 126 Id.  
 127 See Ctr. for Union Facts, supra note 124.  
 128 In re Cesar Chavez Acad., Case No. R05 D-070 at 1 (Mich. Emp’t Relations Comm’n Aug. 30, 2006), 
http://www.dleg.state.mi.us/ham/ber/pdf/2006/r05d070.pdf.  
 129 Id.  
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relations statute.130 The union rebutted that the Commission had jurisdiction 
because the charter school was a “public school academy” under the state’s 
charter school statute and was the employer.131 The Commission dismissed the 
petition.132 It was unclear whether the NLRB would consider the EMO or the 
Academy to be the employer.133 Because the NLRB would arguably assert 
jurisdiction, the Commission concluded that it had to defer to the NLRB.134 On 
December 20, 2012, six days after the Chicago Mathematics decision, a union 
filed a petition with the NLRB to be the bargaining unit for the Academy 
employees.135 In February 2013, the employees of the charter school voted to 
form a union by a 2–1 margin.136 
III.  CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
Private charter school boards and the EMOs that serve them have also 
sought to be treated like private entities in order to evade federal and statutory 
provisions that provide protections to employees and students. Specifically, 
they have argued that they are not “state actors” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
a federal statute that establishes a cause of action for deprivations of federal 
constitutional and statutory rights under the color of state law. 
The first section of this Part summarizes state action case law with respect 
to private schools. Next, it discusses state action case law pertaining to charter 
schools. It points out that in the most recent decision on state action in the 
school context, Caviness v. Horizon Community Learning Center, Inc.,137 the 
Ninth Circuit held that a private, nonprofit corporation running an Arizona 
charter school was not a state actor for employment purposes under § 1983. 
Next, this Part points out how charter school attorneys may use the holding of 
the Caviness decision to argue that charter schools should not be considered 
state actors with respect to student disciplinary decisions. Finally, this section 
discusses important implications of the Caviness case. 
 
 130 Id. at 1–2. 
 131 Id. at 2.  
 132 Id.  
 133 Id. at 6.  
 134 Id.  
 135 David Sands, Detroit Charter School Union Drive Ramps into High Gear, HUFFPOST DETROIT (Dec. 
22, 2012, 11:04 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/23/detroit-charter-school-union-cesar-chavez 
_n_2348289.html.  
 136 Teachers at Michigan’s Biggest Charter School Vote Union, BERGER–MARKS FOUND., http://www. 
bergermarks.org/news/2013/index1.php?art=374 (last updated Feb. 14, 2013).  
 137 590 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2010).  
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A. State Action Litigation and Private Schools 
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the United States Supreme Court, for the first 
time, addressed whether § 1983 applied to private schools.138 A vocational 
counselor and teachers brought separate § 1983 challenges alleging that a 
Massachusetts private school that served maladjusted students had fired them 
in violation of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.139 Almost all of 
the students had been referred to the school by city school committees or by a 
state agency.140 Public funds had accounted for at least 90% of the school’s 
budget.141 To be eligible for tuition provided by a state statute, the school had 
to follow a number of regulations “concerning matters ranging from 
recordkeeping to student-teacher ratios.”142 With regard to personnel matters, 
the state statute required the state “to maintain written job descriptions and 
written statements describing personnel standards and procedures,” but 
imposed few specific obligations.143 The school had a contract with the Boston 
school committee, which stated that the school’s employees were not city 
employees.144 The school also had a contract with the state’s drug 
rehabilitation division.145 Except for general requirements, that contract did not 
cover personnel policies.146 
The First Circuit consolidated the actions and affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of the claims.147 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and found that 
the private school was not a state actor.148 According to the Court, “[t]he 
ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 
is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: 
is the alleged infringement of federal rights fairly attributable to the State?”149 
The Court answered this question in the negative. It found that the school’s 
relationship with the state “is not fundamentally different from many private 
corporations whose business depends primarily on contracts to build roads, 
 
 138 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
 139 Id. at 832–35.  
 140 Id. at 832. 
 141 Id.  
 142 Id. at 833. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id.  
 145 Id.  
 146 Id.  
 147 Id. at 836–37.  
 148 Id. at 837.  
 149 Id. at 838 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for the government.”150 Such agreements 
did not become state action “by reason of their significant or even total 
engagement in performing public contracts.”151 The Court also reasoned that 
the relationship between the school and the teacher did not change because the 
state paid the tuition of the students.152 
Further, the Court found that the state regulations did not make the private 
school a state actor. “[I]n contrast to the extensive regulation of the school 
generally,” the Court asserted that “the various regulators showed relatively 
little interest in the school’s personnel matters.”153 The Court rejected the 
argument that the school was a state actor because it performed the public 
function of providing education.154 To qualify as state action, the function 
would have to be the “exclusive prerogative of the state.”155 The legislature’s 
decision to provide services to maladjusted students at public expense “in no 
way makes these services the exclusive province of the State.”156 Moreover, 
the Court rejected the argument that the fiscal relationship between the school 
and the state created a “symbiotic relationship,” thus making the school a state 
actor.157 This was the case because the school’s fiscal relationship was similar 
to that of many contractors performing governmental services.158 
In Milonas v. Williams, the Tenth Circuit analyzed whether a private school 
for boys could be subjected to a § 1983 action brought by students.159 The 
students claimed that school administrators “acting under color of state law, 
had caused the plaintiffs to suffer and to be subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment, antitherapeutic and inhumane treatment, and denial of due process 
of law.”160 Although the school was privately owned and operated, it received 
funds from both federal and state governments.161 Many of the students were 
placed at the private school by their school districts, with funding for tuition 
coming from state and federal agencies.162 A federal district court awarded the 
 
 150 Id. at 840–41.  
 151 Id. at 841. 
 152 Id.  
 153 Id.  
 154 Id. at 842. 
 155 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).  
 156 Id.  
 157 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 158 Id. at 843.  
 159 691 F.2d 931, 934 (10th Cir. 1982).  
 160 Id.  
 161 Id. at 935.  
 162 Id. at 936.  
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plaintiffs injunctive relief because the practices “were carried out under the 
cloak of state action.”163 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.164 It found that the 
state had so insinuated itself with the private school “as to be considered a joint 
participant in the offending actions.”165 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
observed that many students “were placed at the school involuntarily by 
juvenile courts and other state agencies.”166 Further, “[d]etailed contracts were 
drawn up by the school administrators and agreed to by the many local school 
districts that placed boys at the school.”167 The court cited the “significant state 
funding of tuition” and the “extensive state regulation of the educational 
program at the school.”168 The court concluded that “[t]hese facts demonstrate 
that there was a sufficiently close nexus between the states sending boys to the 
school and the conduct of the school authorities so as to support a claim under 
Section 1983.”169 
The Tenth Circuit distinguished the instant case from Rendell-Baker. It 
noted that the First Circuit in Rendell-Baker had opined that students “would 
have a stronger argument than do plaintiffs [vocational counselor and teachers] 
that the school’s action toward them is taken ‘under the color of’ state law, 
since the school derives its authority over them [students] from the state.”170 
The Tenth Circuit agreed with this contention, declaring: 
To us, Rendell-Baker differs from the present case in at least one 
important respect. The plaintiffs in the present case are not 
employees, but students, some of whom have been involuntarily 
placed in the school by state officials who were aware of, and 
approved of, certain of the practices which the district court has now 
enjoined. Rendell-Baker does not control the Section 1983 issue 
before us.171 
By contrast, in Robert S. v. Stetson School, Inc., the Third Circuit found 
that a private school for sex offenders was not a state actor with regard to its 
 
 163 Id. at 939.  
 164 Id. at 945. 
 165 Id. at 940.  
 166 Id.  
 167 Id.  
 168 Id.  
 169 Id.  
 170 Id. (quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 641 F.2d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 1981), aff’d, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 171 Id. 
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students.172 In this case, a student claimed under § 1983 that the school and 
several staff members violated his constitutional rights “by subjecting him to 
physical and psychological abuse.”173 “None of the members of the board of 
trustees or the board of corporators were appointed by a government entity, 
and none were federal, state, or local employees.”174 The school entered into 
various contracts with state and local governments to provide treatment and 
education for juvenile sex offenders.175 The school received $200 per student 
from Philadelphia and covered costs not covered by tuition through “grants 
from private foundations, other charitable contributions and loans.”176 Private 
school staff ran the daily operation of the school with no involvement from 
Philadelphia or its department of human services (DHS).177 
The Third Circuit affirmed the federal district court’s holding that the 
charter school was not a state actor.178 “In light of Rendell-Baker,” the court 
found that “many of the factors upon which [the claimant] relie[d] . . . [were] 
insufficient to establish state action.”179 For instance, the receipt of public 
funds did not make the private school a state actor.180 Similar to Rendell-
Baker, the DHS’s contracts “did not ‘compel or even influence’ the conduct on 
the part of the . . . staff that [the claimant] challenged.”181 As was the case in 
Rendell-Baker, the record failed to show that the private school performed a 
function that had “traditionally been the exclusive province of the state.”182 
The Third Circuit refused to apply the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Milonas 
to the instant case.183 The Tenth Circuit’s reliance on “state funding of tuition 
and the detailed contracts between the school and local school districts” was 
“squarely inconsistent with Rendell-Baker.”184 The court was also unclear 
about what the Tenth Circuit “had in mind when it sought to distinguish 
Rendell-Baker on the ground that the plaintiffs in that case were school 
 
 172 256 F.3d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 2001).  
 173 Id.  
 174 Id. at 162.  
 175 Id. at 163. 
 176 Id.  
 177 Id.  
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employees, rather than students.”185 The Third Circuit speculated that the 
Tenth Circuit made this distinction because “it believed that some state 
officials ‘were aware of, and approved of’ certain of [the private school’s] 
practices concerning the treatment of students.”186 However, the Third Circuit 
doubted whether such awareness was sufficient to establish state action in light 
of the fact that the Supreme Court had ruled in San Francisco Arts and 
Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee “that governmental ‘approval of or 
acquiescence in’ the challenged conduct was not enough to establish state 
action.”187 The Third Circuit then determined that it did not have to decide 
whether it agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Milonas because the 
cases were very different.188 School officials, who knew about the school’s 
activities or approved of them, had not placed the plaintiff into private 
school.189 Rather, a legal custodian had enrolled the plaintiff into the school 
with his mother’s consent.190 
Similarly to the Third Circuit, the First Circuit in Logiodice v. Trustees of 
Maine Central Institute held that a private school, which had contracted with a 
school district to educate its high-school-age students at public expense, was 
not a state actor under § 1983 when it disciplined a student.191 The student 
alleged that the school violated his due process rights by suspending him for 
seventeen days without a hearing.192 The contract provided the school’s board 
of trustees with sole authority over school disciplinary matters.193 
The First Circuit found that the private school was not a state actor under 
the public function doctrine, which finds state action where “the private entity 
is engaged in a traditionally exclusive public function.”194 This finding was 
compelled because “[e]ducation is not and never has been a function reserved 
to the state.”195 The First Circuit also rejected the claim that the private school 
was a state actor under the entwinement test, which the Supreme Court 
established in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
 
 185 Id.  
 186 Id.  
 187 Id. at 168 n.10 (quoting S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547 (1987)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 188 Id. at 168.  
 189 Id.  
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 191 296 F.3d 22, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2002).  
 192 Id. at 25.  
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Association.196 The entwinement test requires a finding that the private entity is 
“entwined with governmental policies or when government is entwined in [its] 
management or control.”197 Brentwood involved a nonprofit association that 
established and enforced standards for athletic competition for public and 
private schools.198 The Supreme Court found that there was state action 
because the membership of the association was comprised overwhelmingly of 
public school officials, the majority of the funding came from the state, and the 
association set the applicable standards, instead of the state’s board of 
education.199 
In Logiodice, the First Circuit observed that there were similarities between 
the instant case and Brentwood: “The state regulate[d] contract schools in 
various respects”; the school district sponsored 80% of the contract school 
students; and “in certain respects (public busing to extracurricular events, 
transfer of lower-school records, assistance with registration), [the contract 
school’s] students [we]re treated as if they were regular public school 
students.”200 However, the First Circuit found no entwinement in the instant 
case because the private trustees, not public school officials, ran the school, 
and the school’s contract provided that the trustees had sole authority over 
student discipline.201 
The First Circuit acknowledged that it could create an ad hoc exception 
based on the fact that “Maine has undertaken in its Constitution and statutes to 
assure secondary education to all school-aged children.”202 Further, the private 
school was “for those in the community the only regular education available 
for which the state will pay.”203 Another significant consideration was that 
while “[a] school teacher dismissed by a private school without due process is 
likely to have other options for employment[,] a student wrongly expelled from 
the only free secondary education in town is in far more trouble.”204 However, 
to make an exception, the court had to be convinced that “the threat is serious, 
 
 196 Id. at 27–28 (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 
(2001)).  
 197 Id. at 27 (alteration in original) (quoting Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 198 531 U.S. at 291.  
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reasonably wide-spread, and without alternative means of redress”; the court 
concluded that “[n]one of these elements is satisfied in this case.”205 
One reason for this conclusion was that while the student did not receive 
the public-school-level due process, he was not completely denied of 
procedural due process.206 The school informed both the child and the parents 
about the reasons for the suspension, and while “[m]issing 17 days is a cost,” 
the school’s request that the student receive a psychological evaluation before 
being allowed to come back to school was understandable.207 Moreover, there 
was no indication 
that contract schools in Maine are disciplining students in an 
outrageous fashion and leaving Maine school children without an 
education. There are costs (rigidities, law suits), and not just benefits 
in inflicting constitutional standards wholesale upon privately 
governed institutions. . . . Before creating a new state action category, 
a lower court is entitled to insist upon some showing of need—
beyond the small arguable unfairnesses that are part of life.208 
The court also observed that state law required the school district to provide 
the plaintiff with a free secondary education.209 If the private school had 
wrongly expelled the student, the school district could still be required to 
educate him.210 While this solution would be a problem in this case because the 
school district so heavily relied on the private school to provide an education, 
it was likely that “a Maine court would compel the school district to satisfy its 
statutory obligation by providing him an education.”211 The court opined that 
“we are all dependent on private entities for crucial services and, in certain key 
areas, competition may not furnish protection. . . . [S]tate statutory and 
administrative remedies are normally available to deal with such abuses 
and . . . ‘constitutionalizing’ regulation of private entities is a last resort.”212 
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B. State Action Litigation and Charter Schools213 
Several courts have analyzed whether charter schools, their governing 
boards, and the private companies that either provide services to or run these 
schools were state actors pursuant to § 1983. The courts in New York, Ohio, 
and Pennsylvania found that these bodies were state actors because the state 
charter school laws defined charter schools either as public schools or 
municipal entities. An Illinois district court held that a private entity operating 
a charter school was a state actor because charter school governing boards 
were subject to the same disclosure requirements as other state governmental 
bodies. By contrast, in Caviness, the Ninth Circuit held that a private, nonprofit 
corporation that operated an Arizona charter high school was not a state actor 
under § 1983.214 This section provides an overview of those cases. 
1. Ohio 
In 2002, an Ohio federal district court first addressed the question of 
whether charter schools and the private companies that operated these schools 
were state actors. In that case, Riester v. Riverside Community School, a 
terminated teacher sued the charter school and the management companies that 
provided services for that school under § 1983.215 She alleged that the charter 
school and the management companies violated her First Amendment rights by 
terminating her in retaliation for her complaints pertaining to the lack of 
services for a troubled student.216 
The charter school and the management companies then moved to dismiss 
on the ground that they were not state actors under § 1983.217 The court denied 
the motion.218 It found that the state charter school law defined charter schools 
as public schools.219 It thus followed that the charter school, and by extension 
the management companies, were state actors.220 The court further found that 
management companies were state actors under the public function and 
 
 213 This summary of the state action cases regarding charter schools originally appeared in Preston C. 
Green et al., Charter Schools, Students of Color and the State Action Doctrine: Are the Rights of Students of 
Color Sufficiently Protected?, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 253 (2012).  
 214 Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F. 3d 806 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 215 257 F. Supp. 2d 968, 969–70 (S.D. Ohio 2002).  
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 970.  
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entwinement tests—two tests used to determine whether private companies are 
state actors.221 Under the public function test, a private company is a state actor 
when it provides a traditional state function.222 The court found that the 
management companies were state actors because “free, public education, 
whether provided by public or private actors, is an historical, exclusive, and 
traditional state function.”223 The court rejected the defendant’s assertion that 
Rendell-Baker required a different conclusion because (1) the charter school 
was created “only with the help of the state,” and (2) the charter school was 
“subject to various rules and regulations to which private schools [were] 
not.”224 Similarly, the district court rejected the defendants’ reliance on 
Logiodice because the Ohio statutes made it clear that charter schools were 
public schools.225 
The court also agreed that the management companies were state actors 
under the entwinement test, which states that “private conduct may become so 
‘entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental 
character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations on state 
actors.’”226 The court concluded that the private companies were state actors 
under the entwinement test because they “have been granted the authority to 
provide free public education to all students in a nondiscriminatory manner; no 
other entity . . . has been so mandated by the State of Ohio besides local school 
districts.”227 
2. Pennsylvania 
In 2003, a federal district court in Pennsylvania found that charter schools 
were state actors under § 1983. In that case, Irene B. v. Philadelphia Academy 
Charter School, parents of a student attending a charter school filed a § 1983 
action alleging that a charter school violated the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA).228 The child, who had been attending Philadelphia 
public schools prior to the events that triggered the litigation, was a “15-year 
old boy with Down Syndrome, mental retardation, and profound hearing loss 
 
 221 Id.  
 222 Id.  
 223 Id.  
 224 Id. at 972–73.  
 225 Id. at 973.  
 226 Id. (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)).  
 227 Id.  
 228 No. Civ.A. 02-1716, 2003 WL 24052009, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2003).  
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in his right ear.”229 His mother contacted the founder and principal of the 
charter school and the president of the school’s board of directors.230 The 
president told the mother that the school could meet his educational needs and 
would develop a new Individual Educational Plan (IEP) for the child that 
would incorporate life skills and academics.231 When the child enrolled as an 
eighth grader in the school, his parents provided the school with his prior IEP, 
which was developed by the Philadelphia School District.232 The parents 
asserted that, other than speech therapy and bus transportation, the charter 
school failed to provide the services promised to their child under his prior 
IEP.233 Also, the parents claimed that the charter school failed to develop a 
new IEP as it had promised.234 
The parents then sued in district court alleging a violation of IDEA.235 The 
court rejected the charter school’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted.236 The court found that the § 1983 claim 
could proceed because “[i]t is now well-settled that a municipal entity is a state 
actor for purposes of liability under § 1983.”237 Public school districts were 
municipal entities.238 Similarly, the court noted that because charter schools 
were independent public schools, they were part of the school system.239 Thus, 
it was appropriate to treat charter schools as state actors with respect to IDEA 
claims.240 
3. New York 
In 2006 and 2007, two New York federal district courts also concluded that 
charter schools were state actors under § 1983. In the 2006 decision, Matwijko 
v. Board of Trustees of Global Concepts Charter School, a former teacher 
alleged that the principal and the board of a charter school terminated her in 
violation of the First Amendment because of her actions as chairperson of the 
 
 229 Id. at *2.  
 230 Id.  
 231 Id.  
 232 Id.  
 233 Id.  
 234 Id.  
 235 Id. at *1.  
 236 Id. at *13. 
 237 Id. at *11.  
 238 Id.  
 239 Id.  
 240 Id.  
GREENBAKEROLUWOLE GALLEYSPROOFS 1/21/2014 3:59 PM 
2013] HAVING IT BOTH WAYS 329 
school’s advisory council.241 The defendants moved for judgment on the 
pleadings on the ground that the defendants were not state actors pursuant to 
§ 1983.242 
The court denied the defendants’ motion on the ground that the New York 
charter school statute provides that charter schools are “‘independent and 
autonomous public school[s]’ performing ‘essential public purposes and 
governmental purposes of the state.’”243 The court also noted that charter 
schools had to “meet the same health and safety, civil rights, and student 
assessment requirements applicable to other public schools.”244 Additionally, 
charter schools received 100% of the per-pupil funding provided to other 
public schools, and any public student was qualified for admission to a charter 
school.245 Further, the school code permitted charter school employees to 
participate in the public retirement system and afforded these employees 
protection under New York’s civil service law.246 Therefore, the fact that the 
code did not consider charter schools otherwise as public employers did not 
“remove them from the realm of state actors.”247 The court concluded that the 
legislature intended charter schools to be public schools despite the fact that 
they were exempted “from certain regulatory burdens associated with 
traditional public schools.”248 The court found that Rendell-Baker was 
inapplicable because New York law did not consider charter schools to be 
private schools.249 
In Scaggs v. New York State Department of Education, students attending a 
charter school brought a § 1983 action against that charter school and Edison 
Schools (Edison), the private entity that operated the school.250 The plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Equal Protection Clause.251 The defendants 
moved to dismiss the claim on the ground that Edison was not a state actor.252 
 
 241 No. 04-CV-663A, 2006 WL 2466868, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2006).  
 242 Id. at *1. 
 243 Id. at *5 (quoting N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2853(1)(c)–(d)).  
 244 Id. (quoting N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2854(1)(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 245 Id.  
 246 Id.  
 247 Id.  
 248 Id.  
 249 Id.  
 250 No. 06-CV-0799 (JFB)(VVP), 2007 WL 1456221, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2007).  
 251 Id. at *2.  
 252 Id. at *1, *12.  
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The district court contrasted the instant case with Rendell-Baker.253 Because 
Rendell-Baker was an employment action regarding a single teacher, the state 
was “only minimally or tangentially involved.”254 Conversely, the plaintiffs’ 
allegations in the instant case “relate[d] to the alleged total inadequacy of a 
school to provide free public education to its students while receiving state 
funding, being bound to state educational standards and purporting to offer the 
same educational services and facilities as any other public school.”255 Because 
the plaintiffs’ claims challenged the quality of education provided by charter 
schools, the court held that their § 1983 action could proceed.256 
4. Illinois 
In 2009, a federal district court in Illinois held that a not-for-profit 
organization that owned a charter school was a state actor pursuant to 
§ 1983.257 In that case, Jordan v. Northern Kane Educational Corp., the not-
for-profit organization (NKEC) relieved an employee of her duties as 
executive director of the charter school and made her a full-time teacher.258 
NKEC later terminated her employment as a teacher.259 The former employee 
then filed a complaint under § 1983, alleging that NKEC violated her due 
process rights by failing to provide a hearing before firing her.260 NKEC 
moved to dismiss the claim on the ground that it was not a state actor under 
§ 1983.261 
The district court denied NKEC’s motion to dismiss. The court observed 
that although Illinois’s charter school law did provide that charter schools were 
public entities, it failed to address explicitly whether the entity that owned the 
charter school was a public entity.262 However, the charter school law did 
provide that governing bodies of charter schools were subject to the same 
disclosure requirements that applied to other state governmental entities.263 
Therefore, it was apparent that the legislature intended charter school bodies to 
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 257 Jordan v. N. Kane Educ. Corp., No. 08 C 4477, 2009 WL 509744, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2009). 
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function as public entities.264 Consequently, the court concluded that NKEC 
was a state actor pursuant to § 1983.265 
5. Caviness 
By contrast, in Caviness, the Ninth Circuit held that Horizon, a private, 
nonprofit corporation that operated an Arizona charter high school, was not a 
state actor with respect to employment matters.266 Caviness contended that the 
charter school, acting under the color of state law, deprived him of “his liberty 
interest in finding and obtaining work without due process by making ‘several 
false statements about’ him in connection with his employment” without 
providing him notice or a name-clearing hearing.267 The district court granted 
Horizon’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Horizon was not a state 
actor.268 
Caviness then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.269 The court affirmed the 
district court’s motion to dismiss with respect to the § 1983 claim.270 The 
Ninth Circuit would have found that Horizon was a state actor “if, though only 
if, there [were] such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action 
that seemingly private behavior [could] be fairly treated as that of the State 
itself.”271 To determine whether there was a close nexus, the court’s inquiry 
began by examining the specific conduct at issue because an entity may be a 
state actor for some matters but not others.272 The Ninth Circuit then found that 
Caviness failed to argue that Horizon’s specific conduct rendered it a state 
actor.273 Instead, Caviness asserted that Horizon was a state actor as a matter of 
law under the state’s charter school scheme.274 “Therefore,” the court reasoned, 
“Caviness’s appeal must fail unless being an Arizona charter school is, by that 
fact alone, sufficient to make Horizon the government for employment 
purposes.”275 
 
 264 Id.  
 265 Id.  
 266 Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 267 Id. at 811 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
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 270 Id. at 818.  
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The court rejected Caviness’s first argument that charter schools were state 
actors for all purposes, including employment matters, under the state’s 
statutory and regulatory scheme.276 In support of this assertion, Caviness 
observed that Arizona statutes defined charter schools as “public schools” and 
that the state attorney general had concluded that charter schools were political 
subdivisions under the state open meeting act.277 The court disagreed with this 
argument because a private entity may be a state actor for some purposes but 
not others.278 
Caviness also argued that Horizon was a state actor because it provided 
public education, which Caviness characterized as a “function that is 
traditionally and exclusively [under] the prerogative of the state.”279 The Ninth 
Circuit countered that Rendell-Baker foreclosed this argument.280 The Ninth 
Circuit found that the instant case was like Rendell-Baker in that the Arizona 
statute authorized the charter school sponsor to provide alternative educational 
choices at public expense.281 As in Rendell-Baker, such a legislative choice did 
not place these services under the exclusive power of the state.282 
Caviness also claimed that Horizon was a state actor because the state 
regulated personnel issues related to charter schools.283 The Ninth Circuit 
rejected this assertion, noting that state action may occur if the state had 
exercised coercive power over the private entity.284 On the other hand, 
subjecting a business to mere regulation did not convert the private entity into 
a state actor.285 Even extensive regulations did not make a private entity a state 
actor if the regulations did not compel the private entity’s challenged 
conduct.286 The court found that the charter school statute did not control 
Horizon’s post-termination decisions.287 Indeed, the statute expressly exempted 
Horizon from all rules relating to school districts, including providing 
employees the right to a hearing after dismissal.288 The Ninth Circuit found 
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further support for its conclusion because of the absence of any reference to 
charter schools in the statutory provisions related to certified teachers’ 
employment rights.289 
Further, the court found the fact that charter schools could participate in the 
state’s retirement system did not make Horizon a state actor.290 It was settled 
case law that states could subsidize the operating costs of a private entity 
“without converting its acts into those of the state.”291 Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the fact that Horizon became a state actor because its sponsor 
had the power to approve and review its charter, including its personnel 
policies.292 Mere approval of the actions of private entities did not convert their 
personnel decisions into state action.293 This was the case even when the state 
had the initial power to review the qualifications of the schools’ employees.294 
C. Import of Caviness 
The charter school state action cases raise the question of whether a charter 
school becomes a state actor merely because charter school statutes define 
them as public schools. The Riester court went so far as to declare that the 
Third Circuit’s decision in Logiodice was inapplicable because the charter 
school statute clearly stipulated that private schools were public schools.295 On 
the other hand, in Caviness, the Ninth Circuit did not rely on the declaration 
that charter schools were public to conclude that they were state actors.296 
Instead, the court looked at the language of the enabling statute and the charter 
contract to conclude that the charter school was not a state actor with respect to 
employment actions.297 
Those who argue that charter schools are state actors on the basis of 
statutory declarations that they are public schools seem to conclude that the 
term “public schools” encompasses the provision of constitutional rights. 
However, courts have applied other definitions of public schools, such as 
“under the control of the Legislature”;298 “common to all children of proper 
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age and capacity, free, and subject to and under the control of the qualified 
voters of the school district”;299 and “established under the laws of the state, 
usually regulated in matters of detail by the local authorities in the various 
districts, towns, or counties, and maintained at the public expense by taxation, 
and open without charge to the children of all the residents of the town or other 
district.”300 Because these definitions do not include any mention of 
constitutional protection, it was possible for the Caviness court to find that a 
charter school was not a state actor with respect to employment matters, even 
though the Arizona statute declared that charter schools were public schools. 
The charter school cases also raise the question of whether students should 
be treated differently from employees for state action purposes. Most state 
statutes exempt charter schools from school district discipline policies, instead 
allowing charter schools to devise their own policies subject to the approval of 
the charter authorizer.301 Thus, if a charter school devises a student discipline 
policy that does not impose constitutional due process standards with charter 
authorizer approval, then that charter school would not be a state actor for its 
student disciplinary policy under the compulsion test used in Caviness. Indeed, 
when Preston Green, one of the authors of this Article, made a presentation on 
the application of civil rights to charter schools at a workshop for the Alliance 
of Public Charter School Attorneys on the application of desegregation 
mandates and federal civil rights laws to charter schools,302 several attorneys 
who represented charter schools asserted that the analysis applied in Caviness 
could be applied to constitutional challenges regarding students. 
The § 1983 private school cases provide support for the attorneys’ position. 
Three circuit courts addressed the question of whether children attending 
private schools should be treated differently from teachers with respect to state 
action. While the Tenth Circuit in the Milonas case answered the question in 
the affirmative, the First and Third Circuits found no reason to treat private 
school children differently from employees for § 1983 purposes. In Logiodice, 
the First Circuit refused to create an ad hoc exception for students, even though 
the state had undertaken a state constitutional duty to educate children, and the 
 
 299 State ex rel. Sch. Dist. No. 3 v. Preston, 140 P. 350, 351 (Wash. 1914). 
 300 Newman v. Schlarb, 50 P.2d 36, 39 (Wash. 1935) (internal quotation mark omitted).  
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private school in question was the only available school for high-school-aged 
children.303 The court refused to find such an exception because the state was 
still obligated to educate children who were expelled from the private 
school.304 Similarly, children expelled from charter schools without due 
process could be readmitted into one of the traditional public schools in the 
students’ attendance zone. 
The possibility that charter schools may not have to provide due process for 
students has negative implications for certain students. According to Education 
Week, the expulsion rate for charter schools was generally similar to that of 
traditional public schools, which was 1 student in 500.305 However, a few 
urban districts had much higher discipline rates for charter schools than both 
traditional public schools in the district and the national rate. In San Diego, the 
thirty-seven charter schools had a suspension rate of eight percent, which was 
twice the suspension rate of traditional public schools.306 In Newark, the 
suspension rate for charter schools was ten percent, while the suspension rate 
of traditional schools was three percent.307 In Washington, D.C., only 3 
students were expelled from the city’s 45,000-student system, while 227 
students were expelled from the city’s 35,000-student charter school system.308 
Several urban school districts have responded to these disproportionately 
high disciplinary rates by considering changes to the policies governing 
discipline in charter school districts. San Diego now requires charter schools to 
clarify their expulsion procedures, and the city school district reviews the 
expulsion decisions and discipline data of charter schools when they are being 
considered for reauthorization.309 Washington, D.C., is considering requiring 
charter schools to spell out students’ disciplinary procedures in more detail.310 
If charter school attorneys succeed in arguing that charter schools are not 
state actors under § 1983 with regard to discipline decisions, they might 
unintentionally make charter schools susceptible to state constitutional 
challenges that charter schools are private schools that are ineligible for public 
funding in the long run. Students might decide to make due process challenges 
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under state constitutional law instead of federal constitutional law. They would 
do so with the hope that state courts would find that charter schools are public 
schools under state constitutional law, and that state constitutions require 
charter schools to provide constitutional protection to students. 
The Cesar Chavez Academy case suggests that charter schools might claim 
that they are private entities with respect to student disciplinary decisions, 
despite the fact that charter school law defines them as public schools. Recall 
that a number of charter school states have authorizing bodies that are 
nonprofit private entities governed by boards of directors consisting of private 
citizens.311 Also recall that charter school statutes permit private boards of 
directors to operate charter schools.312 Thus, a state court might find that a 
charter school is a private school with respect to disciplinary decisions because 
there is no governmental oversight or compulsion. 
If charter schools succeed in convincing state courts that they are private 
schools under state law, then they might expose themselves to subsequent state 
constitutional claims alleging that their private characteristics make charter 
schools ineligible for public funding. Recall that charter schools survived state 
constitutional challenges that they are ineligible for public funding by 
emphasizing their public characteristics. If charter schools begin emphasizing 
their private characteristics in state constitutional cases, they might cause 
courts to more carefully examine claims that they are “public” for funding 
purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that charter school supporters, private charter 
school boards, and EMOs have opportunistically emphasized their public 
nature to be eligible for funding under state constitutional law, while 
emphasizing their private characteristics to evade federal and state statutory 
requirements that apply to public entities. While such opportunistic lawyering 
may provide charter schools with short-term advantages, it may have the 
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making them vulnerable to claims that they are really private schools that are 
ineligible for state public funding.313 
 
 313 See Adam Emerson, A Bad Precedent for Charter Schools, THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., http://www. 
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regulations).  
